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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
E. L. ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LE\\~S Y. TRUE1IAN, Judge of the
Second Judicial District of the State
of Utah; JOSEPH HOLBROOK,
Sheriff o f Dans County, U t a h;
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy
Sheriff of Davis County, State of Utah;
David F. Smith, Commissioner of
Agriculture of the State of Utah; and
C. G. McCULLOUGH, Deputy In·spector of the Utah State Commission
of Agriculture,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATE~IENT

OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, E. L. Allen, is now and for some
time past has been engaged in the business of selling milk and cream products. He maintains and
operates a place of business. on the east side of
Highway No. 91 in Davis 1County, ~utah, imme·Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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diately north of the Salt Lake- Davis County line,
at which place he sells milk and cream .products
at retail over the counter.
In the conduct and operation of plaintiff's business, he has acquired both by purcha:se and exchange over the counter in the course of his retail
trade, various types of milk and cream bottles, hi~·
practice being to require of his customers that they
bring their own bottle either to have filled or to exchange over the counter for each bottle owned by
plaintiff delivered to them over the counter; or if
the customer does not bring his own bottle, that he
pay a deposit for each bottle taken out.
In the delivery of milk in Halt Lake City and
adjacent territory, it has been the cus.tom for many
years preceding the filing of plaintiff's petition, that
when milk is: delivered in refillable glass :nhllk containers by any dairy Oli distributor to the doorstep
of a residence customer,. or to a hotel or restaurant,
that the dairy or distributor so delivering said milk
has not required of its customers that they l)ay any
deposit for any bottles left with them. The practice has also been that such dairies or distributors
who had a wholesale trade, and who would deliver
their milk and cream to stores and other wholesal~
outlets, would not require of such stores or other
wholesale outlets that they secure a deposit for the
return of such re:fillable glass bottles as were deJivered by such stores to their retail trade.
Petitioner and one Ezra M. Peterson have been
:the only individuals or concernR selling milk and
cream in refiliable g-lass bottles who have required a
deposit for bottles delivered to cnstomerR, when no
bottlers of the customer have been given in exchange.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
Not only have other dairies and distributors failed
to require a deposit to guarantee the return of their
bottles, but such dairies and distributors have not
in any way required that their customer8 be responsible for the bottles delivered to them, nor that such
customers be obliged in any manner to account for
such bottles as they may fail or neglect to return: to
the dairy or distributor who ha'S delivered bottles
to them.
As a re'Sult of this practice, the bottles bearing
the marks or names of the various dairies have been
indiscriminatelv di'Stributed over the whole Salt
Lake area a:rld "'customers have been in the habit of
taking bottles from various dairies and exchanging
them at stores when they buy milk at stores, and
have also been in the pra~ice of taking bottles from
one dairy or bottles that they receive at stores, and
returning thase bottles to the dairies delivering milk
to such customers at their door step, and as a result
of the indiscriminate practice of distributing of bottles around in this manner, the public ha·s acquired
the practice of taking any bottle and exchanging it
at any place, store or dairy they might choose to deal
with whenever they buy milk or cream products.
As a result of this practice, and as a result of the
failure of the various dairies to require their bottles
to be delivered back to them by their customers, a
very large number of bottles of every description
and trade mark continue to circulate among the public generally; and the public, including the customers
of plaintiff, assumes that in the buying of milk at
any store, they need only to take a bottle for exchange regardle'ss of the type of bottle they may
have. Because of this practice, it ha:s been difficult
not only for plaintiff, but for other dairies to retain
bottleH purchased by them, and bottles of other daiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ries have because of such practice been exchanged
over the counter, and have been acquired by plaintiff
in exchange for bottle·s purchased frorn supply
houses and other sourees by plaintiff.
For a considerable length of time prior to the
filing of plaintiff's petition, there have been operated, by two different groups or dairies in Salt Lake
.City, two separate bottle exchanges, and in connection with said exchanges, it has been the practice for
dairies or distributors with trade marked bottles to
take to one or the other of such exchanges bottles
bearing trade marks other than their own, and to
receive from such exchange therefor approximately
one cent per bottle, and also to receive from such
bottle exchange bottles bearing that dairy's own
trade mark, upon paying therefor 1.3 cents per bottle. These exchanges have been operated by the
various dairies and distributors using trade marked
bottles, and for their exclusive benefit, and no pro_
vision has been made by said exchanges or any of
~aid dairies or distributors to exchange bottles upon
any fair or equitable basis with any dairy or distributor who did not have a trade marked bottle.
The various dairies and distributors who are
members of said bottle exchanges do not bring to said
exchanges any plain or unmarked bottles which may
come into their possession; and if any dairy ur diiitributor who does not have a trade mark of his own
but uses plain bottles, brings to the bottle exchange
bottles which have come into his possession bearing
the trade marks of other dairies or distributors, he
will be paid therefor only approximately one cent
per bottle, and the exchange will have no bottle·s to
return to him for 1.3 cents~ per bottle, or for any
other price.
The petitioner has no trade mark of his own, but
ha~ purchased and used numerous plain hottles and
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oth~r bottles with marks and brands which have not
been registered. These bottles cost approximatPly
8 cents each, and by exchange of these bottles over
the counter, petitioner has -.(quired various bottl~s
bearing the trade marks which have been registered
by other dairies or distributors; and the various dairies and distributors have reque"Sted that petitioner
bring these trade marked bottles to the bottle exchange and turn them over to the exchange for approximately 1 cent per bottle, with no offer of any
plain or other bottles for 1.3 cents, or for any other
price.
The various dairies and especially the larger
dairie'S, who have established trade marks on their
bottles, have, in spite of the indiscriminate distrib_
uting of their bottles and the paying to the bottle exchange for recovery thereof, continued to claim ownership of the "Same wherever they may be located,
whether in the hands of the bottle exchange or stores
or individual members of the buying public; and in
order to recover the po·ssession of bottles bearing
their trade marks, they have called upon the criminal authorities, and the law enforcement authorities of the State to a:ssist in reclaiming·
the bottles which they have allowed to be indiscrimL
natdy distributed to the public generally.
During the month of December, 1938, at the instigatio::l of some of the larger dairie·s using trade
mrrrked bottles in Salt Lake City, and pursuant to
Section 95-2-10, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, a
search and seizure warrant was is·sued by Fred Lindbeck, Justice of the Peace for the Third Precinct of
Salt Lake County, under which search and seizure
warrant 366 milk and cream bottles were taken from
petitioner, and a hearing was scheduled to determine the ownership thereof. Petitioner immediately secured a writ of prohibition from this
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Court, and after a hearing thereon this Honorable Court held such ·statute to be unconstitutional.
'That case is entitled,
.bJ. L. Allen v. :b'red Lindbeck, et al, and is
reported in .. Utah, .. ; 93 .Pac. (2d) 920.
While that case was pending in this Uourt, and even
beiore argument thereon, the larger dairies in Balt
Lake City secured the passage of an Amendment to
the Trade Mark Statute by the State Legislature, and
:5uch Amendment now appears asChap.110,Page 144,
Session Laws of 1939. Not only was Section 95-2-10
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, amended, but two
other sections of Chapter 2, Title 95 were amended.
Section 95-2-10 as amended by Chapter 110,
Page 144, Ses~.;ion Laws of 1939, read::;
as follows:
"95-2-10. WRONGFUL USE,_ SEARCH
A N D SEIZURE - PROCEDURE
AFTER: SEIZURE.
Any person may make affidavit before a
court of competent jurisdiction that he ha·s
reason to believe, and does believe, setting
forth the facts upon which such belief is
· based that any receptacle, container, carrier, box, equipment or supplies bearing or
having ·stamped, impressed or produced
thereon, the name, mark, brand or device,
claim to which has been filed and published
as provided by law, is, or are, in the possession of any person other than the owner
thereof in violation of the provisious of any
statute or that any such receptacle, container, carrier, box, equipment or supplies
is, or are ·secreted in .any,place specified in
such affidavit. The court may thereupon ex-
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amine on oath the complainant and any witnes'Ses that may be produced or subpoenaed
and take their depo'Sitions in writing. If it
shall appear from the affidavit or from the
affidavit and deposition or depositions
that there is probable cause to believe
that any such property is unlawfully possessed or secreted as aforesaid, the court
shall issue a search and seizure warrant
for such property.
The warrant shall be directed generally
to any peace officer of the State of Utah
and shall require him to take such property intc;·his po'Ssession and hold the same
subject to the order of the court.
Any peace officer to whom such warrant
is delivered shall execute the same in the
daytime anywhere within the State, Provided, that if the warrant is issued out of
a justice of the peace court it may not
be executed outside the county in which
the issuing court sits unless the county
clerk of that county shall first ~dorse
thereon his certificate that the ·signature
affixed to the warrant is the true signature of the person who is duly qualified
and acting as justice of the peace of the
issuing court.
If the officer when executing the warrant
finds there is contained in any receptacle
or other container seize'd by him under
the warrant any personal property of such
nature that it can be _handled only in receptacles or containers, the officer may take
such property with the rece-ptacles described in the warrant and hold the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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until the per;:;on from whose possession it
was taken produces other receptacles or
containers to receive it and then demands
its return or the officer may at his option
furnish receptacles or containers for receiving ·such property and deliver the same
to such person. In the latter case, the
person to whom such receptacles or containers are furnished shall redeliver the
same to the officer within forty-eight hours
of his receipt thereof and shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor for a ·willful or negligent
failure so to do.
When the officer takes the property pursuant to the warrant he shall give a detailed receipt therefor to the person found
in po·ssession thereof or if no such person
is found he shall leave such receipt in the
place in which the property is found. After
taking the property into his possession
the officer must forthwith return the warrant to the court with a written inventory
of the property seized thereunder.
Upon the filing of the officer's return the
court shall order him to hold the property seized pursuant to the warrant until
otherwise ordered by the court. The court
shall thereupon give notice of a hearing:tO'be
held to determine the right to the possession
of said property. Notice of ·said hearing
shall be given by posting notice of such
hearing at the place where said property
was seized and notice shall be served upon
the person, if known, from who·se possession the property was taken by the officer seizing the same. Notice shall also be
served upon the ownrr of ·said property
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as shown by the records of the secretary
of State and upon such other persons as
the court shall have rea'Son to believe have
any interest in the seized property.
At the hearing any person appearing and
asserting any interest in writing to any of
the seized property, shall be made a party
defendant. The court shall then proceed
to the trial of the i'Ssues as made by the
claims of the parties to said action and
shall determine the party en'titled to possession of smd property and shall order
the retV,n of ·same to said party.''
Pnrsua.hflto this amended Section 10, and upon
affidavit of C. G. McCullough, a deputy of the
Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Utah,
a search and seizure warrant was issued by the de.
fendant Judge Lewis V. Trueman, on or about the
26th day of July 1939; and pursuant to said search
and seizure warrant, the sheriff of Davis County
searched petitioner's place of business and took
therefrom 724 refillable milk and cream bottles
bearing various regi·stered trade marks. Subsequent to the return of the sheriff upon said
search warrant, a warrant of attachment was issued
by the defendant Judge Lewis V. Trueman, directing the sheriff to bold ·said bottles, and the County
Clerk of Da,-is County issued a notice directing
that all persons claiming any title or ~nterest in
said bottles should file a claim on or before: August
19, 1939, the date which was set for a hearing upon
the sole question of the right to the posses·sion of
~aid bottles.
Petitioner has at all times insi·sted that he has
an ownership interest in said bottles and a right to
have a hearing in connection with the same in an
action properly instituted for such purpo·se, rather
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than in a criminal action or quasi criminal action
based upon a search and seizure warrant.
At the time the bottles were seized from plaintiff's place of business, the plaintiff was not required to accompany the officer or to appear before the court, nor was anyone else at plaintiff\:;
place of business requested to accompany the
,-,fficer with the bottles. No arrest of the plaintiff
·was Inade or contemplated, and no action of any
nature, either criminal or otherwise, was filed
against plaintiff either to determine the question as to whether he had violated thEi provisions of Chapter 2, Title 95, or otherwi~se. The
sole purpose of the search and seizure proceeding's
as instituted, and everything done in iCO.nnection
therewith and the further proceedings threatened
by the defendants, was and is to determine the civil
question of the right to the possession of said refillable milk and cream bottles.
Claims were filed in the District Court tsl arFarmington by Fabian, Clendenin, Moffat & :Mabey1
as attorneys for the various dairies who had received notice that among the 724 bottles were bottle-s bearing their trade marks, and the defendants
were intending to proceed with the hearing upon
the question of the right to possession of said
'bottles.
Upon this ·state of facts, the plaintiff made
application for the writ of prohibition herein, upon
the grounds that the amended statute under which
the defendantf: were proceeding is unconstitutional
and void.
An alternative writ of prohibition was issued,
and by way of return thereto, attorneys F'abian,
Clendenin, Moffat & :Mabey, on behalf of the defendants Lewis V. Trueman, Joseph Holbrook and
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Calvin G. R-oberts, filed a general dmnurrer to
plaintiff's petition applying for the writ, and also
filed a lengthy answer, which raises no issue of
(fact although it contains a rather lengthy narrati'e of facts which are admitted by all parties.
The only issue raised by the demurrer and answer
is one of law with respect to the constitutionality
of the statute invol,ed. The other defendants
have failed to answer or make any return to the
writ as issued.
BASIS OF APPLICA'riON FOR WRIT AND
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
The plaintiff in seeking the writ of prohibition insists that the defendant Judge Lewi·s V.
Trueman was proceedng in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him, and that the search warrant,
as issued, and the search and ·seizure made thereunder, was entirely illegal and void, for the following reasons :
1.
That Section 95-2-10, Revised States of Utah,
L933, as amended by Chap. 110, p. 144, Utah Laws
of 1939, is unconstitutional and illegal and void, in
that it violates the provisions of Section 14 of
~~rticle- I of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
and that such a search and seizure a'S is provided
therein is, and would be, an unreasonable search
and seizure.

2.
That the said statute violates the provrsions of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, in that said
~tatute denies to this plaintiff th~ equal protecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion of the laws and the privilege·s and immunitied
granted to him as a citizen of the United States .
.o).,
':l_1hat said statute is further null and void in
that it is not intended to, and does not, promote the
publio health, rmorats, safety or· welfare, but
amounts to special legislation in favor of a certain
,~roup or clasf, of individuals in that it grants to
them the right to use the criminal authorities of
the State of Utah and criminal procedure in the
recovery of personal property claimed by them,
instead of leaving them to the usual civil remedy
for the recovery of ·such property .by- replevin or
claim and delivery, and is therefore contrary to
and in violation of Section 24 of Article I, and subparagraph 16 of Section 26 of Article VI of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
-!.

rrhat the statute is arbitrary and constitutes
an unreasonable classification and denies to plaintiff the equal protection of the laws in violation of
the provisions of both the Constitution of the
United States and of the Constitution of the State
of Utah.

5.
That said ·statute violates the provisions of
Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, in that it offends against the constitutional rights given to plaintiff, with ot4er
citizens, to acquire, posses·s and enjoy property;
no question of police power, public health, morals,
safety or general welfare being concerned.
6.
The said statute allows the i·ssuance of a search
"..-arrant by a court upon an affidavit based merely
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upon information and belief, and without requiring
the judge who issues the warrant to find probable
cause therefor, and in fact takes away the power
lor neceS'Sity of the judge. to find probable cause,
and is therefore an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Section 14, Article I of th~ Con.
stitution of the State of Utah.

7.
That said statute is unconstitutional and the
proceedings thereunder illegal stnd void because
the said statute violates Section 7, of Article 1, of
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, by depriving plaintiff of hh;
property without due process of law.

ARGUMENT
'THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE INVOLVED
HEREIN IS AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, AND THE STATUTE
AUTHORIZING IT IS THEREFORE VOID.
It has been the contention of petitioner all
through the proceedings connected with this con·
troversy, that regardless of the property rights or
the rights to possession of the type of property described in this trade mark law, that tho·se rights
should be tested in proper civil actions, and that
the use of the criminal procedure of search and
seizure for the maintenance of a mere civil and prL
vate right is violative of Federal and State constitutional rights, and that, therefore, a statute authorizing the same is void.
As. will appear from the authorities hereinafter cited, the great weight of authority throughSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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out the whole country has long been to the effect
that search warrants m2-y issue only when the public interest i~ involved, and are not available to
individuals for the n1aintenance of any mere private right.
Such warrants were not known to the early
common law. Their use was at first confined to
the search for stolen goods. They were later extended somewhat and became rather notorious
under the denomination of ·Writs of Assistance in
the earlier colonial days. These Writs of Assi·3tance became so oppressive that the framers of our
Constitution put provi·sion therein that the people
should be secure against unreasonable searche's
and seizures, and the clauses in the F,ederal
and State Constitutions prohibiting' unreasonable
searches and ·seizures have always been looked
upon as of high value to the citizen.
As is stated by the eminent Judge Cooley in
his work on Constitutional Limitations:
''Search warrants are a ·species of process exceedingly arbitrary in character and
which ought not to be resorted to except
for very urgent and satisfactory reasons.''
And that,
''search warrants are .always obnoxious to
very serious objections; and very great
particularity i·s justly required in these
cases before the privacy of a man '·s premises is allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law."
In Cooley's Work on Torts, we read concerning such warrants that
"The authority to issue them

i~

lia hl0 to
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great abuse and the law is justly strict regarding their requirements.''

It is the contention of plaintiff that Chapter
2 of Title 95, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and
particularly Section 10 thereof, both as appeared
originally and as now amended by the 1939 Legi~
l:lture and appearing in Chapter 110, 1939 Session
Laws, was enacted solely for the benefit and protection of civil rights of a certain group or class
of individuals, and wa'S placed upon our statute
books at the request and insistence of certain interests having a selfish motive in view.
There has long been on the 'Statute books of
this State, general statutes with regard to search
and seizure, and these general statutes appear in
the Revised Edition of 1933 as Chapter 54 of
Title 105. In addition to that general statute regarding search and seizure we have other statutes
regarding food products under the jurisdiction of
the State Department of Agriculture. In Section
22, Chapter 10 of Title 3, and the amendments
thereto, is set out provisions requiring containers
used in the sale or delivery of milk and cream products to be clean, and subsequent sections therein
;provide that the violation of that provision is a
misdemeanor. In Section 8, Chapter 10 of Titl~
3, there is provision against the adulteration of
drugs and foods, and in Section 33, Chapter 10 of
Title 3, and subsequent sections, there is provided
a method for search and seizure of adulterated or
misbranded food or drug products. Thus there
wa·s no necessity for the provisions made in Section 95-2-10, either as originally enacted or as
amended by the 1939 Session Laws, ~xcept for thP
fact that it allowed a certain group of people to
use the arm of the State and the criminal authorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ities and procedure of the State to recover a certain class of personal property. The fact that this
is not only the intent of the statute but the condruction placed upon it by those seeking its enforcement, is borne out by the notice of the hearing '~chedulcd after the rGtu1n of the sheriff upon
the warrant, which show~; that the only purpose of
the hearing was to determine the right to possession of the bottles.
This is further borne out by the fact that neither by the provisions of the law as amended, nor
iby the proceedings taken or contemplated by th(~
defendants, was there any suggestion of the filing
of a criminal charge against petitioner in connection with the ·search and seizure of the bottles. All
that they were concerned with was the recovery of
the possession of the personal property.
In the case of
State v. Derry, 85 N.E. 765,
the Supreme Court of Indiana, in discussing the
•ser"rch '"Tarrant statute involved, said:
''This statute is ~mstaint>d under the Federal Constitution forbidding unreasonable
search and seizure, only as a nece-ssary
means in the suppression of crime and the
detection and punishment of criminals,
and is required to be cautiously framed
and strictly construed. Neither at common law, nor under the statute, is such
process available to individuals in the
course of civil proceedings, nor for the
maintenance of any mere private right.
It may only be invoked in the furtherance
of public prosecutions.''
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In the case of
People ex rel Robert Simpson .Company
v. Kempner, 101 N. E. 794,
a New York Court, speaking of the search warrant, stated:
''Its legitimate use is, and always has
been, to aid in the detection and punishment of crime . . . . ''

''It thus appears with rea'Sonable certainty
that in England and the American colonies
the search warrant was a process used
preparatory to the discovery of felons, in
preparing evidence again'St them, and to
help persons robbed to recover their
goods, and not to try the title of or right
to the possession of goods and chattels.
There did not exist at the time of the
adoption of our State constitution in 1777,
any right by the common or statute law
of England and Great Britain, to try the
title to goods and chattels before a magistrate upon the return of a search warrant. Such right did not form a part of
the law of the Colony of New York on the_
19th day of April, in the year of our Lord
1775 . . . "
''There is nothing in any of the provisions
of the Code Iof Criminal Procedure that
authorizes a trial of the title to or possession of the property taken under the
warrant.''
''Search warrants were never recognized
by the common law as processes which
might be availed of by individuals in the
course of civil proceedings, or for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lH

maintenance of any mere private right;
but their use was confined to cases of pulllie prosecutions, instituted and pu:.:·sued
for the suppres·sion of crime or the detection and punislunent of criminals . . . "
''All se.arches therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the complaint or
suggestion of one party into the house or
possessions of another, in order to secure
a personal adv1antage and not wit"M any
design to afford .aid in the administration
of justice in reference to acts or offenses
in violation of penal laws, must be held to
be unreasonable, and consequently under
our constitution, unu'arrantable, illegal and
void.'' (Italic·s ours).
''Where property voluntarily or by aid of
a search warrant comes into the possession of a magistrate or co'Urt from thP
person or posse-ssion of one charged with
crime, and such person is thereafter convicted of having stolen the pro1,erty that
is ·so in the posse0sion of the magistTate
or court from the person chiming to be
the owner thereof, and there are no third
persons claiming such property, it haPdoubtless been the practice, so long as there
i·s any record of it, to order the property
delivered to the person who, as appears by·
the testimony taken upon the trial, rs the
owner thereof. Such an order is analogous
to the obsolete writ of restitution. When,
however, the property has been taken by
a ·search warrant from the possession of
a third person, and there is a controversy
between the person from whom it is
claimed that the property was stolen ann
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the person fron1 whom the posse-ssion of
property was taken by the search warrant,
as to which is entitled to the possession
thereof, a question is presented that cannot be determined upon a crimina] process.
It is a. matter wholly between the contending parties, and of no direct concern to the
State. It must be determined in a civil
action . . . . ''
To the same effect see the case of
State v. District Court, 224 Pac. 862 (Mont.)
See also,
Briggs v. Shepard Manufacturing Company, 105 N. E. 622 (Mass.J
At this point, it will be interesting and instructive
to note one or two differences between the amended
statute and the original Section 95-2-10 of the R~
vised Statutes of 1933, which was declared uncon~titutional by this Court.
The original Section 10, as it appeared in
Chapter 2, Title 95 of the 1933 Revised Statutes.
did have -some semblance of a criminal proceeding,
or seemed to require a criminal proceeding in connection with and as a part of it. That original rsection provided that when the officer seized any receptacles under the search warrant, he should also
"bring before such court the person in whose posSE.~::;sion such receptacle, container, carrier, box,
equipment or supplies may be found, and if it shall
be adjudged that such person ha:s been guilty of a
violation of this Chapter, the court shall award
possession of such property to the owner thereof.''
The phrase ''and if it ·shall be adjudged that
such person has been guilty of a violation of thh:
'Chapter," presupposes that there should be a
criminal charge against and a determination a·s to
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whether the person in possession has been guilty
l(•f a misdemeanor because of son1e violation of the
provi·sions of the Chapter. The new section, as
,amended and as appearing on page 144 of the Law.:;
of 1939, bas no requirenwnt that the person in
whose posse:ssion the receptacles may be found, be
brought before the court, and ha·s no hint or sugge·stion of any criminal cha.rge or hearing or adjudication as to the possessors being guilty of any
violation of Chapter 2, Title 95, or of any other
criminal statute. It is thus entirely shorn of any
semblance to a criminal action, but by its very
terms is merely an extension of a criminal remedy
·-that of ·search and seizure- to and for the ben_
efit of a group of individuals for the maintenance
of a mere civil and private right, viz: the recovery
of the possession of a certain class of personal
property. A search and seizure granted for ·such
purpose is clearly unreasonable, unconstitutional
and void.
In the ca:se of
Yaeger v. State, 83 Southern 525, (Fla.),
a search warrant was issued and the defendant
arrested. The justice of the peace held a hearing
and committed the defendant to the county court
for trial. The defendant sued out a writ of habea8
corpus. The statute 'va·s very similar to the one
in question here and involved milk bottles. :An
affidavit was filed by an agent of the Purity Ice
;Cream & Dairy Company. The affidavit and the
warrant specifically mentioned that the name
"Purity" had been registered and the warrant
directed the seizure of bottles with the word
"Purity'·s" on it and directed the officer to bring
the bottles and the person before the court.
The statute in that case in addition to having
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visions similar to the other 'Sections or chapter 2,
title 95 of the Utah statute. In holding tl1e act
unconstitutional the Florida Supreme Court said:
''The perfectly harmless and innocent act
within itself, that of refilling a gla:ss
bottle, is made penal by the statute merely
because this statute prohibits it; yet the
8ame statute penalizes the innocent act of
refilling it only when and only 'SO long as
the_ same bottle belongs to the highly
favored class who have registered it. The
moment the ownership of the bottle changes
to that of another person or persons it
may be filled and refilled ad libitum without in the lea'St violating this or any other
law.''
•'·We think this feature of the statute
under consideration is an unjust and unreasonable legislative delegation to the
claS'S of people who own a very common
and ordinary class of personal property
an attribute to that property, viz, Hs inhibited refillment, while and only so long
as it remains their property.'' }?etitioner
discharged.
The particular type of search warrant statute
as is involved herein has been befor~ the Supreme
Courts of various State-s, and where a search and
seizure has been involved, the statute has uniformly
been held unconstitutional as being an unreasonable search and ·seizure.
In addition to the cases already cited, we respectfully direct the Court's attention to the cases
cited hereinafter in thi's brief, as they bear directly
upon the question of the un~asonableness of such
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a 3earch and seizure a:s involved herein, as well
as upon matters discussed under subsequent
headings.

'rHE S~J1A'TUTE IN QUESTION VIOLATES
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMI\IUNITIES
AND ALSO THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE UNI'rED sr:rATES CONSTITUTION- IT IS SPECIAL AND CLASS
LEGISLA'riON- NO QUES'rlON OF POLICE POWER IS INVOLVED.
One of the earlier cases involving a question
of a search and seizure in connection with a container law, was the case of
Lippman v. People, 51 N. E. 872.
That was a case which came before the Supreme
Court of Illinoi·s.
Upon an affidavit filed by the Gottfried Brewjug Company, a search and seizure warrant was

issued by a justice of the peace in Cook County
directing the officers to search defendant's premises and seize and bring before the justice 400 beer
bottles and 40 casks, harrels 1 etc., having the mark
of the company on them and to arrest and bring
the defendant before the court. Lippman was
convicted of using the 1narked bottles .and appealed.
In speaking of the powers given under the search
warrant provisions of the act and also of the benefits given by the act with regard to regi8tering
their trade marks and the protection arising therefrom, the Supreme Court stated:
"It confers upon them (owners of the
brand) the power to call upon the State
and its officers and the judiciary to act as
colJectors of thejr bottles, kegs~ and boxes
1
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which they haYe voluntarily scattered over
the State among their customers. It
attempts to place at their disposal the
extraordinary right of the search warrant, by which they may arm a constable
or other officer with process to intrude
upon the pre1nises or the home of any
citizen to reco\er their bottle'S, kegs and
the like. . . . It seen1s that the peculiar
benefits, advantages, and rights conferred.
by this act upon the persons named in it,
and the right to employ an unusual remedy
for the reco\ery of their property, must
be classed as prinleges . . . . ''
The Court in discussing the ,question of search
and seizure stated further :
"The purpose of this act, passed in behalf
of the persons 'named in it, is not to recover bottles stolen, embezzled, or fraudulently obtained by false tokens or pretenses, but to rru1.ke the proceedings 'under
it, .as to su.ch persons, a substitute for the
action of replevin. The general search
warrant law of the State covers all the
caBes just mentioned, and was on our
statute book when this act was passed.
There are and were general laws in force,
applicable uniformly to all persons in the
State, for the recovery of per'Sonal property wrongfully obtained by another. This
law was needless for that purpose, and it
could only have been passed to give to the
particular persons named in it addi tiona}
privileges, by making the criminal law
supersede the writ of replevin. The plain
purpose of the act is to make the officers
of the State detectives, searchers for and
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collectors of beer bottles, be,er kegs, and
the like. It is for a mere private benefit,
having no relation to the police_ power or
the protection of the public against frauds
or injurious preparations; since, if the
brewer or dealer consents, the bottles or
kegs may be refilled with any sort of drink
different from the marks, and it will be no
offense under the act, however inj'urious
to the public . . . . The public has no
rights under it, and neither the title nor
any provision indicates any public. purpose." (Italics ours).

After the statute involved in the Lippman
case wa·s declared unconstitutional, parties interested secured the passage of a new act by the legis_
lature of Illinois in an attempt to obviate the
objections of the earlier act but to accomplish the
•same result and that second act. came before the
Supre1ne Court of Illinois in the case of
Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Labo:r.atory
Company, 68 N. E. 938.
·When that act came before the Court it wa:s argued
that its purpose was to protect the public and
manufacturers of food products from frauds and
imitations and to prevent the public from being
deceived in the use of adulterated foods.
The same claim might he made in the case at
bar but in view of the provisions of chapter 10 of
title 3, Revised Statutes of 1933, we cannot see
:how any one could ·seriously contend for that position in this case. The Supreme Court of Illinois
in answering the contention stated, (at page 940):
''. . . . Neither thf\ title nor the lang-uage
of the act shows evidence of any such pur-
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po·se. The law is entirely silent in regard
to the quality of the commodity that may
be sold in the receptacles by the owner or
by the person to whom the owner may have
given his written consent to use or buy
the receptacle. There is no provision that
the person who has purchased one of these
receptacles with the written consent of the
owner shall only put therein food products of as high a standard as those manufactured by the original owner of the
receptacle (by which term we de·signate
the owner whose registered mark of ownership appears on the receptacle), or that
the food placed therein shall be of any
particular standard of purity . . . . ''

'' \\Te have examined this ·statute in vain
for the purpose of finding any evidence
that it was intended by the legislature to
apply particularly to food products. The
only thing that could possibly be construed
as any evidence on that score is the fact
that it describes receptacles in which food
might be sold; but it will be observed that,
in the list of these receptacles, cans, boxes,
kegs, and barrels, are included containers
in which gunpowder, boots, and shoe's,
nails, lime, and an innumerable number of
other articles of merchandise are habitually inclosed and sold. A patient consideration of the provisions of this statute leads
us to the conclusion that its purpose, like
that of the earlier statute, was to facilitate the recovery of certain kinds of personal property, to 'Wit, the receptacles
described in the first section of this statute,
which have passed from the possession of
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the owners thereof to others, and U'hich
the owners desire to recover summarily.
The act is wholly for the benefit ot the
owners of personal property of this class,
and is designed to give to the owners of
personal property of this cbass rights and
privileges not possessed by the owners of
other classes of personal property."
(Italics ours).

"It is argued that this law should be sustained under the police power of the State.
It ha·s been frequently said by this Court
that where a statute is referable to that
power it must appear that it tends in some
degree towards the pr:_evention of offenses
or the preservation of the public health,
mor~a.Zs, safety, or welfare . . . .
(Cases
cited). It cannot be contended that the
selling or usingl of any of the-se receptacles in the manner prohibited by this
statute, viz., without the written consent
of the owner, is in any manner more injurious to the public health, morals,
safety or welfare than if the smne things
be done with the written consent of the
owner. The written consent of the owner
is no guaranty to the public that any wrong
which it is in the power of the purcha:ser,
possessor, or user of the receptacles in
question to do the public will not be
done." (Italics ours).
At page 942:
'' . . . . this legislation concerns the owners of personal property. It attempts to
legislate for the benefit only of the owners
of such personal property as is named in
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this act, and i8 therefore legislation conferring special rights ~md privileges upon
a portion only of the owners of personal
property. There is no reason that sugge-8ts itself to our n1inds, and none has
been suggested by counsel, why such owners should be entitled to this special protection, or why they should be considered
a class by themselves, so that legislation
for their benefit alone would not be obnoxious to the Constitution. . . . ''
•' . . . They ·stand on the same footing as
other owners of personal property, and any
law favoring them above others, for the
reason alone that they own personal property of the kind specified in this act, is a
special law, within the meaning o'f our
Constitution.''

In the case of
Sch~rmck,

83 N. E. 797,
the Supreme Court of Ohio had a "bottl~ law"
before it for consideration. The defendant was
indicted and charged with use of bottles of seven
different beverage bottling companies. The Ohio
Court in disposing of the que·stion, stated (p. 800):
State v.

"It is manifest that the general public has
not been offended by the commission of the
acts alleged in the indictment, nor does the
·statute in question make criminal any act
in which the general public is concerned.

"
''The statute is not aimed at the adulteration of any merchandise, food, or beverage, nor does it appear from its terms
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that a compliance with it will tend to prevent adulteration, or secure to the public
pure 'merchandise,' pure 'food,' or pure
'beverage·s.' Its sole purpose seems to be
the protection of the owners of certain described articles of personal property, who
are engaged in a limited line of business,
and the act might well be entitled 'An aet
to protect persons engaged in the ·selling
of any merchandise, food or beverages in
bottles or other vessels from the loss of
their bottles or other vessels.' Thrs purpose pervades every line of the statute, including the provision for search and ·seizure, and it is given crilninal caste in order
to secure to such owners a. better prote0tion than is or perhaps oon be afforded t9
owners of any other class of property. As
to the recovery of other kinds of property
by the lawful owner, he must rely on proceedings in a civil action; but here the
State of Ohio is to become the plaintiff,
and in a drastic criminal procedure, not
only 'get at' the property for the ,owner
and restore it, but to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, the person who ha:s
trespassed upon the title or possession of
the owner. To aid in the work of pro'Becution, the premises of the accused may be
searched on a warrant for that purpose,
and the entire machinery of this statute
exalts this ·species of property above all
others. The owners of such bottles, vessels, land their contents, mostly various
kinds of beverages, are not left to civil
remedies to which owners of other goods
must resort in order to maintain their
rights, but they may invoke the sovereign
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power of the State mul its most commanding processes to s~.-we them from the loss of
bottle and box.

•'It is difficult to concei,ye of a clearer
ca'Se of class legislation in favor of certain dealers who have the ordinary means
of reclaiming their property available to
other citizens~ plus the criminal procedure of the State to not only reclaint but
to punish. '"e ha\e not yet fully stated
the entire character of this legislation.
It is part of 'Section 4364-43 that 'the requiring, · taking, or accepting of an) deposit for the return of any such stamped
or designated bottle or \essel, or cover or
stopper or attachment belonging to same,
or box or receptacle used for handling or
transportation of same, or the demanding
or accPpting of any compensation for the
nonreturn of any such property shall not
be deemed a 'Sale of such property, either
optional or otherwise, in any proceeding
under this act.' Therefore the owner who
·sells food or beverages in bottles or other
vessels may take a deposit to secure the
return of his bottle or vessel, or he may
demand and accept compensation for
their nonreturn, yet he still owns the
property, for such acceptance shall not be
deemed a sale either optional or otherwise. In other words, the owner may demand and accept a sufficient deposit to
secure him, or he may demand and accept
full compensation for the nonreturn of his
bottles or other vessels, yet he still owns
them, and may prosecute the party found
in pos·sps;3ion through sale or otherwise,
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without the written consent of the owner.
rl,he possession, with the verbal consent of
the owner, will not protect, for a written
consent must be ·shown.
"A careful examination of this statute
warrant8 the statmnent that innocent persorrs may come into possession of such
articles - persons out of the counly
where the publication prescribed has been
made and who had no knowledge thereof
- and yet his premises may be ·searched
on warrant, property seized, and such
person, by fact of such posse'ssio.n, confronted with a prima facie case against
him. The posses·sion without the written
consent of the owner becomes a crime, if
a prescribed publication is made; if no
publication, no crime. The State has not
convinced us that ·such a statute should be
upheld. We are told in the brief that
several States of the Union have enacted
similar laws, and that in two or more ·such
States the law has been held valid by the
courts of last resort. We have not the
space for a comparison of the statutes of
the various States named in the brief. It
would ·surprise us somewhat if any State
has enaeted a law containing all the characteristics of the one before us. If precisely s1tch legislation is found elsewhere
it tends to prove the assiduity of persons
who are engaged in similar occupations in
those jurisdictions.'' (Italics ours).
We have already referred to the general statutes a·s they appear in the Revised Statutes of
1933, with respect to regulations for sanitation,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
adulteration of food products, etc. These statutes
appear as Chapter 54 of Title 105, Chapter 10 of
Title 3, and particularly Sections 8, 22 and 33
thereof, ~ogether with other sections in Title 3.
These statutes, it seems, would be a complete answer to any contention that this amended Section
95-2-10 would have any reference to police po"\ver
or morals. There is the further fact that this search
and seizure i~ allowed for the recoYery of containers only where the trade marks on those containers have been registered. Is there any reason that
J1as any relation to police power or morals, why the
~)ublic hedth and welfare would be better served
by allowing a search warrant in favor of an indindual who had filed a trade mark. and refusing
a search warrant for an individual who had a trade
mark by which he could just as well identify his
container, but had failed to file it 1 D_oes the
registering of a mark tend in any manner to promote better 'Sanitation, or the production and distribution of purer foods T There can scarcely be
any contention that this would be the case in face
of Section 11 of the same statute, which allows
possession of the containers to be transferred without restriction, by a mere writing. from the owner.
In the case of
State v. Wiggam, 118 N. E. 684,
the Supreme Court of Indiana had under consideration a similar "bottle law." It was contended
there that the law violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution, and also the
clause requiring laws to be general and of uniform
operation. In holding the law invalid~ the Supreme
Court of Indiana stated :
''The legislature must classify in nearly
every act which it pas·ses but there must be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
a reason for the classification based on the
public health, public morals or public welfare. What is reasonable must be a judicial
que·stion; oth~rwise the limitations in the
Constitution are meaningless; and the legislature is omnipotent in the legislative field.''
''The 'privileges and immunities' section,
the 'cla·ss' section, and the 'general law'
section, are not violated, if the act is reasonably designed to protect the health,
morals or welfare of the public.''
"The State contends that this act is designed to protect the public against fraud
in the use of containers bearing a name
or trade-mark, but it is not shown that the
public may be protected if the owner gives
his 'written consent' or 'sell's' the containers to another. The persons buying them,
or obtaining such consent, may, so far as
this act is concerned, defraud the public all
he pleases. The State says that this act
also protects the public health against inferior food products. 'Cans, kegs and
barrels' :rp.ay contain nails, dynamite, or
lime. So far as this act is concerned the
person who _complies with it may build up
a reputation for a ·superior product, and
collude with another to defraud the public
by filling the containers with an inferior
food or drink or anything else that they
are designed to hold.''
"The State also contends that there is a
public demand, and therefore a public
necessity for such a law, and, in ·support of
this, calls our attention to the fact that 30
States have passed similar law;;;. This
makes us circumspect to detect rem~on for
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such laws b·ut does not convince 'US that
tkis u·as not brought about by the pernicious acfiPity of the self'ish . . . . ''
(Italics ours).
Let us look at our statute, again, in view of
the foregoing authorities. It will not be contended
.by the defendants that the law applies merely to
refillable glass bottles - that, clearly, would be a
special law. It applies to ''any receptacle, container, carrier, box, equipment or supplies'' bearing a brand or mark "claim to which has been
filed and published a'S provided by law" - that
is, a mark which has been registered and filed with
the Secretary of State.
It is a well-known fact, which we think will
not be disputed, that numerous ''receptacles, containers, carrier'S, boxes, equipment and supplies''
of many kinds are in use generally with the public. Many of these receptacles, containers, boxes,
etc., bear various marks or brands and not aU of
those marks or brands are registered or filed with
the Secretary of State. The petitioner has, on
various occasiorrs, used refillable glass bottles
which bore some mark or identifying brand, but
those marks or brands were not registered or filed
with the Recretarv of State. No matter how many
different kindf', ~f "rece'Ptacles, !containers, carriers, boxe-s'' etc., may be in use, and may be distributed around among the public, and no matter
how many identifying marks or brandS! may be
used by various individuals upon their boxes, containers equipment and supplies, etc., under this Act,
those individuals who have registered and filed
their inark or brand with the Secretary of State,
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ceedings for the recovery of their receptacles, containers, boxes, equipment, etc., while other individuals, using the same identical type of box or container or equipment, even though he may have an
identifying brand upon it, can not have the State
authorities recover his property for him by search
and seizure merely because he has not filed and
.regi·stered his mark or brand with the Secretary of
State.
The ,petitioner, who has at various times used
bottles with unregistered marks or brands on
1them, is not entitled to the help of the State and
it's criminal authorities, and is not entitled to in·voke the use of the search and seizure warrant to
recover bottles he could identify, merely because
he has not registered and .filed any mark or brand.
But petitioner, and others similarly ·situaited, are
left to their remedy by replevin, and must stand
the. expense of it themselves, and will be required
to put up a replevin bond to guarantee that they
will not direct the sheriff to take pos·session of
property, the possession of whidh they are not
ju~tly entitled to.
Other dairies and distributors
are allowed to use the State and its criminal authoritie·s, and the -criminal procedure of a search and
seizure warrant, to recover th~ir property, merely
because they have registered and filed their mark
or brand with the Secretary of State.

It is difficult for petitioner to see how any
case could present a more patent violation of the
\Privileges and immunities clause of the Federal
Constitution. It is difficult for petitioner to see
how any other conclusion could be reached than
that this statute denies to petitioner, and others
similarly situated, the equal protection of u~E' laws
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as granted to him by the United States Constitution, and the Constitution of this State.
It is clearly a case of special and class legislation, enacted solely for the purpose of granting
to that group or class of individuals who file and
register their marks, privileges not extended to
others similarly situated, merely because those
others have not filed and registered their brands.

It may be argued by defendants that the pronsion for filing and registering their mark is
merely one for identification purposes. We hardly think, howe\er, that defendants will contend with
much 'Seriousness, or that this Court would take
the view that it would be very difficult in the usual
case for an indindual to identify properly as his,
when it has his name or brand on, even though
that brand is not registered and filed; or, that the
mere filing and registering of a mark or brand
contained on a box, container, or receptacle, etc.,
would make it ea'Sier to identify that container,
than \\Ould be the case with the same container
hearing the same brand but not registered.
It may also be contended that the purpose of
the statute is to protect registered trade marks
and trade names; and it is true that Title 95 is
headed ''Trade ~I arks and Trade Names.'' But
other provisions of Title 95 provide for the protection of trade marks and trade names, and Section 10 of Chapter 2, either as originally framed
or as amended by the 1939 Laws, was unneoessary
for that purpo·se, and was only put on the statute
books for the purpose of facilitating the recovery
of certain types of personal property for the benefit of a limited group or class of people.. This
i::; further borne out by the very words o:fi the. Title
of the Act pa:ssed by the 1939 Legislature, as it
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appears at Page 144, Chapter 110, Session Laws of
1939. That title, as it refers to Section 10, reads:
" . . . . Providing for the issuance of
·search and seizure warrants and the procedure thereon for the recovery of any such
containers, oorriers, or equipment, anu for
the summary adjudication of the o"'nership of any thereof seized upon warrant.

"
'fhus, the whole title and purpose of the Act
involved herein rshows merely that it is 1the
extension of the criminal procedure and remedy
of the search and seizure warrant to the maintenance of a purely civil and private right: that of the
recovery of the possession of a certain type of personal property for a limited and favored group or
cla·ss of individuals, where' no reasonable or
logical basis for classification exists, and where
no question of public health, safety, or morals i·s
in any manner involved.
aR

DUE PROCESS
In the prior action filed by petitioner, attacking Section 10 as it appeared in the 1933 Revised
Statutes, we contended that the statute violated
the due process clarrse because no proviS:ion was
made in that statute for notice or £or a hearing in
connection with the disposition of the property
seized on the search warrant. Apparently that objection wa·s considered sound by our legislators because in the amendment as passed by the 1939
Legislature, provision is made that after return of
the property seized by the officer, pursuant to the
warrant, ''the court ·shall thereupon gtive noticP
of a hearing to be held to determine the right to
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the possession of said property.'' Then follow
further provisions with respect to how is'Sues are
to be frcuned and parties brought into this hearing with respect to tl1e posse'Ssion of the property.
It may be contended by the defendants that this
sufficiently answers the requirements of the due
proce-ss clause of the Constitution.
\Ye think the amendment does not avoid the
objection on t11e grounds of due process, because
of the fact that the search and seizure warrant,
according to the terms of Section 10, is and must
be based upon and issued upon an affidavit, and
that it must be stated in the affidavit that these
receptacles are ''in the pO'ssession of any person
other than the owner thereof, in violation of the
provisions of any statute.'' Thus, as a basis of
thE: iS"suance of this search and seizure warrant,
there must be a statement in the affidavit which
in effect may be somewhat in the nature of a
ch2..rge, against the possessor, of the commi'Ssion
of a crime, amounting to a misdemeanor, that is,
that he has poS"session of these receptacles in violation of the provisions of the statute. Although
this is contained in the section as the nece·ssary
basis upon which the search and seizure warrant
is i·ssued, the hearing that is provided by Section
10 is not a hearing with respect to whether the possessor has violated any of the provisiorrs of the
statute, but merely a hearing with respect to the
ciril right of possession after the officer has thP.
receptacles in his possession. If it is necessary to
charge one in possession of such property with
having possession thereof in violation of statute,
in order to warrant the issuance of the 'Search and
seizure writ, there should be provided, in order to
constitute due process, a notice and hearing with
respect to whether or not the pos·sessor has the
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possession of the property in violation of s:tatut~.
No provision for a notice and hearing in that respect i·s made by the statute.
There is a further defect in Section 10 and
that is with respect to the hearing as scheduled.
It is stated:
"The Court shall then proceed to the trial
of the i·ssues as made.''
No right of trial by jury is given, and no right of
appeal is given.
Because of these defects in the statute as
amended, we think that the amendment did not obviate the objection that the statute violated the due
proces·s clause of the Constitution of the United
States, and of the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
The statute, itself, is not consistent as i's shown
by the fact that the charge upon which lthe search
~warrant is iS'sued is based upon.. one theory - that
of a violation of statute - and the hearing that is
scheduled upon the return of the search warrant is
upon an entirely different theory, towit: that of
a question merely of a civil right to possession of
property.

REQUIREMENTS OF AFFIDAVIT UPON
WHICH SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS
BASED.
The main basis of the Court's decision in the
prior action, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, was that it allowed a search and seizure
warrant to be issued upon an affidavit 1nade Inerely upon information and belief. By the amendrnent it was sought to correct this defect, but the
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statute still states that any person may 1nake affidavit ''that he ha'S reason to believe and does belieYe,'' and then adds the requirement that" there
must be a ''setting forth t11e facts upon which such
belief is based.'' EYen though the facts upon
which the information and belief is based mav be
set forth, the affidavit is still one based, cle~rly,
upon information and belief. The requirement
should ha\e been tl1at there be set forth facts
from which the court could find probable cause for
such belief, but that requirement was not placed in
the amendment. Also, the statute does not place
the burden upon the Court or~ Justice to find that
there is probable cause. It states
"if it shall appear from the affidavit and
depositions that there is probable cause to
believe . . . . the Court shall issue a search
and seizure warrant for such property.''
It may be argued that this requires the Court to
find probable cause, but that is not necessarily the
.result of the language. It does not state that the
Court is the one to determine probable cause, and
it does not state that the facts set forth in the
affidavit must show probable cause. Petitioner,
therefore, que-stions whether the difficulty with
respect to the affidavit was obviated by the
amendment.
RIGHT TO ACQUIRE, POSSESS AND ENJOY
PROPERTY.
In 12 American Jurisprudence, section 505,
page 187, we read:
''Part of the liberty of a citizen consists
in the enjoyment upon terms of equality
with all others in ·similar circumstances,
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of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary
calling or trade and of acquiring, holding
and selling property.''
See also
11 American Jurisprudence, page 1145,
section 335,
where the constitutional right to acquire, possess
and enjoy property is discussed. See also
Gillespie v. People, 58 N. E. 1007.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,62 L. Ed.
149, and
rr,errace v. 11hompson, 263 u. s. 197, 68
L. Ed. 255.
Property is more than the mere thing which a
person ovms. It includes the right to acquire, use
and dispose of it and the rights to life, liberty and
property and equal protection includ~, -,the right
freely to buy and sell a·s others may and the right
to contract and to acquire property. The authorities are numerous to this effect and for that reason plaintiff will omit any citation thereon except
to quote the following from the case of
Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Laboratory
Company, supra, wherein the Court
stated:
''There is no reason which can set th~ legislative police power of the State in motion
for placing in a ·statute a provision that the
seller or bailer must give to the buyer or
bailee his written consent to buy or use an
article of personal property sold or bailed.
The manner in which the acquiescence of
the seller or bailer in ·such a transaction
shall be evidenced is wholly for the parties themselveR.''
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The Court in that case went on to state that
the evident purpose of the "Statute was
''to so fully protect the original ow.ner
whose registered marks 'of ownership
appeared on the article, that' he should have
to meet no evidence except evidence written by himself, if an issue upon the question of his consent arose
''The legislature has no authority to pronounce the performance of an i,nnocent act
criminal, when the public health, safety,
comfort or welfare is not interferred
with.''
0

0

0

0

''

With these and oth€r considerations, the
lllinois Court did not he"Sitate to hold the statute
unconstitutional
The requirements of Section 95-2-11 of this
statute are that ownership can not be transferred
except by writing, and the defendants charge by
their answer that plaintiff has been trafficking in
bottles. Yet, at the same time, the various dairies
interested in this trade mark statute, and who use
trade marked bottles, exchange possession of their
bottles daily with customers, without even the suggestion of a verbal agreement; and they allow those
customers to trade their bottles at stores and witb
other dairies, and then thase same dairies pick up
bottles bearing brands other than their own, take
them to the bottle exchange and receive a . .consideration from the bottle exchange for them, and
pay to the bottle exchange a consideration for the
return of their own bottles brought there by other
<tmries. That constitutes trafficking in bottle-s as
much as petitioner's practices. These ~same dairies
deliver their bottle·s to customers without even a
verbal agreement on behalf of their customers that
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the customers shall be responsible for the bottles.
and yet they attempt, under the terms of this
statute, to make third parties to whom the customers may transfer the possession of those bottles,
criminally liable under Chapter 2 of Title 95, and
subject to having their homes or other property
entered by virtue of a search and seizure warrant.
We believe that thi·s is extending, criminal procedure too far, and extending the search warrant
much farther than precedent allows.
This is not the first time that the matter of
the possession and use of branded milk bottles by
dairies other than the one claiming the brand has
been before this Court. In the case of
Clover Leaf Dairy Company v. Van Gerven,
72 Utah 290, 267 Pacific 1020,
1an injunction was sought against the use of branded
bottles by another dairy. :The trial court granted
the injunction and this Court reversed the lower
court and directed that the injunction and the 1 action
he dismissed and this Court in suggesting a remedy
to the dairy <'stated, (at page 297) :
'' . . . . They can commence now to do
what we have ·suggested they should have
done when they first put their trademarked bottles jn circulation. They can
contract with their customers to return
their trade-marked bottles or be responsible therefor. When they have once established that custom, their trade-mark will
be of some value. It will be prima facie
evidence of ownership, and the traffic in
bottles bearing their trade-marks will
either cease or be done at the peril:'of those
who engage in the traffic.''
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Until the 8Uoaogestion given by this Court with
regard to requiring customers to be responsible for
the return of trade-marked bottles is complied with
various bottles will continue to be indiscriminately
pa'Ssed from one person to another and one concern
to another by the public and as long as that practice continues, no person, whether a dealer in milk
J>roducts or otherwise, should be subjected to such
a 'Search and seizure as is provided for by this
statute and as was done in this particular ca8e.
Even an individual in a private home who fails or
neglects to return bottle-s of various dairies which
he may receive ·by trade with various stores could
be subjected to having his home entered with a
search and seizure warrant the same a:s any place
of business could be entered with a search and
seizure warrant under this section.
One of the earliest cases upon the subject is
the case of
Robinson v. Richardson, a Massachusetts
case. reported in 13 Gray 454,
in which the Court reviews a little of the history
regarding search warrants and states that they
should be used only for the purpose of suppression
of crime or detection and punishment of criminals.
This case together with lengthy excerpts from the
opinion, is quoted by Justice Cooley in the 8th edition of his work on
Constitutional Limitations, Volume 1, page
626, at which place Judge Cooley also
concludes :
"We think it would generally be safe for
the legislature to regard all those searche·s
and seizures 'unreasonable' which have
hitherto been unknown to the law, and on
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that account to abstain from authorizing
them, leaving partie·s and the public to the
accustomed remedies.''
We think that in the matter involved in this
case that the owners of the trade-marked receptacles taken on the search and seizure should be
left to thei1· t:Jcveral remedies of claim and delivery
if they wish to recover their property or to the
remedy by injunction if they want to restrain another from the use thereof and that the statute and
proceeding!J'~fr~d;~~s had and as contemplated
'before ij};; J ~~~t. ,..~f~] 1 noa by the said ~JudJe
qf 11 : p1 ilia? and the said other defendants are
entirely unwarrantable, unconstitutional, illegal
and void.

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW
The application was made by plaintiff and the
·writ sought herein by plaintiff because the remedy
at law '\va·s entirely inadequate. In the case of
People v. Spears, 4 Utah 385,
this Court held that if a justice of the peace was
proceeding in excess of the jurisdiction held by
him, an appeal was neither a speedy or adequate
remedy and that prohibition would lie.
See also Allen v. Lindbeck, supra.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the demurrer
of defendants should be overruled and the alternative writ of prohibition made permanent.
Respectfully submitted,
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURM-AN & MIN.ffiR,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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